February 10, 2026
Joseph Daher
Joseph Daher is an academic and expert on the political economy of the Middle East. He received his PhD in Development Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (2015) and his PhD in Political Science from the University of Lausanne (2018), Switzerland. He is the author of several books, including Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (Pluto Press, 2016), Syria After the Uprising (Pluto Press, 2019), and Palestine and Marxism (Resistance Books, 2024)
Arabic version
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the subsequent process of lifting US sanctions have raised positive expectations for Syria’s future. However, after just over a year, growing difficulties have either surfaced or become more pronounced. These include territorial and political fragmentation, foreign influences and occupations, sectarian tensions, particularly after the massacres in March against Alawite populations in coastal areas resulting in the death of more than 1000 individuals, attacks against Druze populations in April, May, and July, and a suicide bombing in a church in Damascus in June. In mid-July, the dramatic events of Suwayda only worsened the situation, with massive violation of human rights committed particularly by armed groups affiliated and supportive of the central authorities in Damascus. In early October, clashes erupted in Aleppo between two predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods (Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh) and government-held areas, opposing respectively members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus affiliated internal security forces, which were ended at dawn by a local ceasefire. New clashes occurred between both actors in Raqqa at the end of November and in December. Since the fall of the Assad regime, regular clashes have pitted the SDF, dominated by the Kurdish armed group YPG, against the new ruling authorities led by Hay’at Tahrir Sham (HTS) in northern and northeastern Syria, despite an agreement reached in March of 2025 between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration of the North East of Syria on the integration of the Kurdish led-autonomous administration's civil and military institutions into national institutions, even though many points remained unresolved regarding its actual implementation.
All this is taking place in the persistent absence of a politically inclusive and democratic transitional phase. These challenges negatively impact a potential economic recovery and future reconstruction process, which are crucially needed. This is without forgetting that more than half of Syrians remain displaced, either internally or abroad. Over 90% of Syrians are living below the poverty line, and 16.5 million people—three in four—required humanitarian aid in 2025, according to the UN.
In this difficult situation, the new ruling elite led by HTS has been more interested in consolidating its power over the country than working towards achieving a political transition fostering a wider and inclusive participation of Syrian society. For this end, HTS-led ruling authorities have been developing a strategy based on three main factors: new international alliances, domination over state’s institutions and civil society, and instrumentalization of sectarianism.
This article seeks to analyze how HTS policies are strengthening its control and domination over the population in total opposition to the initial demands of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, behaving as a counter-revolutionary actor. The counter-revolutionary actions of the HTS-led authorities demonstrate as well that in a revolutionary process, the “ancien regime” or elements connected to it are not the sole counter-revolutionary pole threatening the interests of popular classes.
Rooting Syria in a New International Alliance
The new ruling authorities led by HTS in Damascus are rooting themselves in a US led alliance, including regional states such as Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. While Ankara and Doha were the main winners of the fall of Assad's regime and have been entertaining relations with HTS for years, Syrian ruling authorities have been careful to diversify their relations with other regional countries, and more particularly the Saudi Kingdom. Syria's Interim President Ahmed al-Shara’a actually stated in the end of December 2024 that “a liberated Syria would ensure security for the region and the Gulf for the next 50 years,” while his first foreign trip was to Saudi Arabia in February 2025 where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Riyad is indeed the key actor able to accelerate regional and international recognition and acceptance. It was in the Saudi Kingdom that President Donald Trump announced in mid May 2025 the removal of US sanctions, and then met the Syrian Interim President Ahmad al-Shara’a in Riyad, in a meeting hosted by MBS.
The recognition of the new Syrian ruling authorities by international and regional powers was followed by many other symbolic events in the following months, including Damascus’ participation in the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2025. Interim President al-Shara’a was also the first Syrian leader to participate in a high-level UN meeting in nearly 60 years and delivered a speech to the General Assembly. The last time a Syrian president participated in the UN General Assembly was in 1967, before the Assad dynasty's 50-year reign. Furthermore, Syrian interim President al-Shara’a was welcomed in Mid November 2025 at the White House by US President Donald Trump, a first for a Syrian head of state. Trump praised al-Shara’a for being a "strong leader," and voiced confidence in him, while vowing to do everything he can to make Syria successful. Prior to the visit, Washington had removed the Syrian leader from its terrorist blacklist, notably following requests from Turkey and Israel. Prior to this, the UN Security Council lifted sanctions against al-Shara’a and his Interior Minister, Anas Khattab, thanks to the US. At the end of December 2025, the United States definitively lifted sanctions against Syria, with the repeal of the so-called "Caesar Act."
This policy has allowed a process of removing sanctions on Syria, opening the path for easing financial exchanges and reintegration of Syria’s economy in the world financial market, facilitating trade dynamics and the conditions to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Syrian diaspora businesses, which are all key objectives of the new ruling authorities. In this context, Damascus has been trying to reach out and attract regional and international companies to invest in the country, particularly to modernise infrastructures and generate revenues. Following the announcement of the beginning of the process of lifting of sanctions, the Syrian government has multiplied Memorandum of Understandings with regional and international companies. The total amount of foreign investments pledged in Syria for 2025 is approximately $56 billion, according to Syrian officials.
This geopolitical orientation and alliance is also made in the objective of attracting FDI from Western states and moreover its regional allies, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey, in the framework of the deepening neoliberal orientation of the new Syrian ruling authorities.
The political economic orientation of the new ruling authorities appears more and more clearly to favour a commercial economic model, characterized by investment in short term profit seeking, to the detriment of the productive sectors of the economy. This is reflected largely in the nature of the investments promised to Syria, and the Damascus’ ruling authorities focus on attracting investments in sectors such as tourism, real estate, and financial services with usually short-term profit return, rather than attempting to encourage FDI in productive sectors of the economy such as manufacturing, industry, and agriculture
This path also includes a form of normalisation with Israel, whether direct or indirect. Interim President al-Shara’a reiterated on numerous occasions that his rule is not a threat to Israel. And in reference to this, he argued that Syria “can play a major role in regional security.” Al-Shara’a added that Syria shares “common enemies” (Iran and Hezbollah) with Israel. Notably, Damascus did not condemn the massive Israeli strikes against Iran as they see any weakening of the Islamic Republic (and Hezbollah in Lebanon) as a positive thing. This position is not only connected to Iran’s violent role in supporting Assad during the Syrian uprising, but it is also reflective of the political orientation of the new ruling elite which is aligned with US policies. This is also why the ruling authorities have increased control of the Syrian border with Lebanon, where weapons and cash destined for Hezbollah have been seized on different occasions since the beginning of the year. It is undeniable that the fall of the Assad’s regime in December 2024 has constituted a major regional impact in the balance of geopolitical forces at the detriment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its networks of influence, including Hezbollah in Lebanon.
While tensions heightened between Damascus and Tel Aviv in mid-July 2025 following the massacres committed by armed militias affiliated or supportive of Damascus’s authorities in the governorate of Suwayda and subsequent Israeli airstrikes against Syria, talks and meetings between officials of both countries have not stopped. Moreover, there were ongoing negotiations between both actors through U.S. mediation to conclude a security-oriented agreement designed to stabilize the border. Al-Shara’a stated once again in mid-November 2025 that Syria is engaged in ongoing and direct negotiations with Israel to reach a final agreement.
Furthermore, also included in the plans to strengthen US control over Syria and the region (as well as protect its ally Israel), is the project to set up a US airbase in Damascus. This is to support a security agreement that US officials are negotiating as intermediaries between Syria and Israel. The military base would be strategically situated at the gateway of southern Syria, which is expected to monitor these areas to guarantee, among other things, the security of Israel.
President al-Sharaa's attempts to revive the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria before engaging more deeply in political normalization are thwarted both by Tel Aviv's refusal to withdraw from the new Syrian territories occupied following the fall of the Assad regime and by Damascus's refusal to comply with the Israeli demand to demilitarize the country's three southern provinces.
A new round of talks, sponsored by the United States, was nevertheless held in Paris in January 2026, lasting two days. At the conclusion of these discussions, the United States, Israel, and Syria issued a joint statement reaffirming the commitment of Damascus and Tel Aviv to establish permanent security agreements and to create “a joint mechanism—a special communications cell—to facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic dialogue, and trade opportunities under US supervision.”
Dominating State’s Institutions, Society and the Economy
Building on the continuous legitimation of its rule by regional and international powers, HTS new ruling authorities have pursued measures to consolidate their power over political, economic and social actors. HTS dominates key positions in state institutions, in the army and security services. Similarly, key positions in the transitional government are held by figures close to al-Shara’a. For example, Asaad al-Shibani and Abu Qasra retained their positions as foreign minister and defense minister, respectively, while Anas Khattab was appointed interior minister in the Syrian Transition Government established at the end of March to replace the previous caretaker government . These figures all held key positions in the HTS power structure in Idlib before the overthrow of the Syrian regime in December 2024. HTS's rule in Idlib since 2017 was characterized by a concentration of power at the political, military and economic levels, as well as by policies combining both co-optation and repression of its rivals and enemies.
Moreover, the new ruling authorities established parallel institutions to further consolidate their power, such as the National Security Council in Syria, headed by al-Shara’a and made up of his close associates (the foreign minister, defense minister, interior minister, and director of general intelligence). In a similar vein, the Foreign Ministry established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs at the end of March 2025 to supervise domestic political activities, formulate general policies related to political matters, and manage assets of the dissolved Baath Party. In addition, in mid-April the brother of Ahmad Al-Shara’a, Maher Al-Shara’a, was appointed secretary-general of the presidency, which involves managing the presidential administration and acting as a link between the presidency and state bodies.
The absence of an inclusive democratic process within the new ruling authority was also reflected in various initiatives, conferences, and committees that were supposed to be participatory and chart the next steps for the country's future. Such initiatives included the Syrian National Dialogue Conference, on February 25, which was widely criticized for its lack of preparation, representation, and seriousness due to the limited time allocated to the sessions. The interim constitution, signed by the interim Syrian president, was also widely criticized by various political and social actors, both for the lack of transparency in the criteria for selecting the drafting committee and its content. Furthermore, while the interim constitution formally declares the separation of powers, this is hampered by the broad scope of powers vested in the presidency. The latest example was the so-called “elections” of the People’s Assembly in October, which resulted in wide criticisms. The methodology and process adopted for selecting members of the future parliament lacked transparency and inclusivity, and acted as a tool to favor actors close to the new ruling regime. Furthermore, interim President Ahmad Al-Shara’a appointed a third of the members of Parliament, while the remaining two-thirds were selected by “regional subcommittees” that are themselves appointed by the Higher Committee for the Election of the People’s Assembly, whose members were selected by the presidency. This is without forgetting that twenty-one seats are also currently vacant, in the provinces of Hasakah and Raqqah in the Kurdish-majority northeast, and Suwayda in the Druze-majority south, which were outside state control during the “elections.” The election commission spokesperson said the seats are still vacant until the appropriate political and security conditions are met. More generally, informal networks have been expanding consisting of “administrative sheikhs” and other secret committees within ministries and state’s institutions in order to manage essential sectors, from security and finance to foreign policy and internal administration, with no or small bureaucratic restrictions. In these circumstances, official channels of state institutions are often ignored, and real power is exercised by a small informal network of individuals working with prominent autonomy and secrecy.
Outside state institutions, HTS-led ruling authorities have also tried to expand their domination over other political and social actors. For instance, they restructured the country’s chambers of commerce and industry by replacing the majority of members with appointees and reduced the number of board members in the main chambers, including Damascus, Damascus Countryside, Aleppo and Homs. Several new board members are known for their close relations to HTS such as the new president of Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce Alaa Al-Ali, former head of the HTS affiliated Idlib Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Additionally, the authorities have also brought in new, affiliated figures to head trade unions and professional associations, while no elections occurred to elect their new leaderships. These practices of appointing members, rather than promoting internal elections, is in direct continuity with the former Assad’s regime.
Furthermore, the brother of Syria’s self-proclaimed President, Hazem al-Shara’a, has increasingly emerged as an important figure in economic affairs and in the management of business elites. He notably accompanied Ahmad al-Shara’a first foreign visits to Saudi Arabia and Turkey and was officially appointed Vice-President of the Syrian Supreme Council for Economic Development. A recent Reuters investigation also revealed that Hazem al-Shara’a, along with other individuals forming a committee, is responsible for reshaping the Syrian economy through secret acquisitions of companies owned by businessmen affiliated with the former Assad’s regime. This committee has taken control of assets worth over USD 1.6 billion from businessmen and companies formerly affiliated with the former Assad regime according to this investigation. Moreover, Hazem al-Shara’a’s central task is to handle relations with local businessmen and attract others residing outside the country, alongside managing investments and development funds established by his brother, Interim President al-Shara’a. At the same time, some prominent figures close to the former Assad palace, like Mohammad Hamsho—historically Maher al-Assad’s ally—and Salim Daaboul, who owns over 25 companies and is the son of a longtime secretary to former ruler Hafez al-Assad, have successfully negotiated reconciliations with the ruling authorities. This was notably reflected with the presence of the sons of Mohammad Hamsho at the Launch of Syria Development Fund in Damascus, on September 4th, for which they donated $1 million.
Similarly, the new ruling authorities have established new economic institutions, which concentrate power within the presidency, limiting independent oversight, including the Higher Council for Economic Development, and the sovereign wealth fund and development fund. In each case, substantial powers and responsibilities are concentrated within the presidency, with minimal mechanisms for oversight or accountability—especially given that the parliament has yet to be established. Similarly, the Supply and Procurement Committee (SPC), established under the Secretary General of the Presidency, controlled by the President’s brother, now oversees all internal and external procurement for state institutions—potentially exerting control over contracts worth billions of dollars. Likewise, the creation of the Syrian Petroleum Company in October 2025, which merged all state-owned oil institutions into a single entity, has further expanded presidential control, including on contracting, extraction, refining, and distribution across the oil and gas sector.
Pursuing this orientation, in mid-November, the "National Committee for Import and Export," was created with the aim of overseeing imports and exports. This National committee is also under the authority of the Secretary General of the Presidency and is chaired by the head of the General Authority for Ports and Customs, with five deputy ministers and the director of customs as members. Fears have been expressed by some merchants that this committee could favour traders close to the new ruling authorities.
The risk of an exclusive control power by HTS and its allies of state’s institutions and expanding power over society could create further cycles of violence and sectarian tensions, while resulting in an elite-led transition process and reconstruction process, which will only reproduce social inequalities, impoverishment, a concentration of wealth in the hands of a minority, and the absence of productive development.
More generally, the ruling authorities have taken measures to strengthen its control over society, including in trying to reduce democratic rights. Local authorities have not hesitated in the past several months to put some forms of restrictions on the organization of political conferences.
While these measures were mostly informal initially, they have taken more formal dynamics more recently. The Syrian Ministry of Tourism issued for instance in November a circular requesting tourist establishments to refrain from hosting any events or conferences of a political nature without prior approval from the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, an entity established by a decision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the fall of the former Assad regime. This measure comes within the framework of expanding the "General Secretariat for Political Affairs" powers to include monitoring political activities.
Sectarianism, a tool of domination and control over society
Finally, to consolidate its power over society, HTS is using sectarianism as a tool of domination and control over the population. While the sectarian violence unleashed in March against Alawite civilians was initially provoked by remnants of the Assad regime who organized coordinated attacks against members of the security services and civilians, the counterreaction encompassed all Alawites, according to a logic of sectarian hatred and revenge. In April and May, armed groups connected to or supportive of the authorities’ mounted attacks against the Druze population, before the massacres committed in Suwayda in mid-July.
Responsibility for the massacres in March and July and the continuous killings and kidnappings of Alawite civilians in coastal areas and ongoing siege against the Suwayda governorate, lies principally with the new Syrian authorities. They failed to prevent them, and indeed some of the militia groups were directly implicated in the attacks, and higher echelons of the state were aware of the massacres and gave their approval, as reported by Reuters and Human Rights Watch. Moreover, HTS ruling authorities produced the political conditions making them possible.
Indeed, human rights violations against Alawite individuals and communities, including kidnappings (particularly of women) and assassinations, have been on the rise in the past few months, some of which — like the Fahil massacre at the end of December 2024 and the Arzah massacre at the beginning of February 2025 — felt like dress rehearsals before the coastal massacres. Then sectarian attacks against Druze populations in Damascus and in the South in Suwayda occurred before the massacres in mid-July. The ruling authorities continuously described these acts as isolated, while taking no serious actions against their main perpetrators, despite the establishment of investigation committees to investigate the crimes committed in the coastal areas and Suwayda, and the beginning of a first trial in Aleppo in mid-November prosecuting both loyalists of the old regime and members of new security forces for the violations of human rights in March 2025 in the coastal areas.
Moreover, HTS and Syrian officials have repeatedly misrepresented the Alawite community as a tool of the former regime against the Syrian people. For instance, during his speech at the 9th edition of the donors' conference on Syria in Brussels, Belgium, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani stated, “54 years of minority rule led to the displacement of 15 million Syrians...” — implicitly suggesting that the Alawite community as a whole had ruled the country for decades, rather than a dictatorship controlled by the Assad family. While it is undisputed that Alawi figures held key positions in the former regime, particularly within its military and security apparatus, reducing the nature of the state and its dominant institutions to an “Alawite identity” or portraying the regime as favouring religious minorities while systematically discriminating against the Sunni Arab majority is both misleading and far from reality.
The authorities also failed to establish a mechanism promoting a comprehensive transitional justice process aimed at punishing all individuals and groups implicated in war crimes during the Syrian conflict. This could have played a crucial role in preventing acts of revenge and putting a lid on rising sectarian tensions.
In addition, transitional justice can also include a social dimension by integrating efforts to recover state assets and hold accountable those responsible for serious financial crimes, such as the privatisation of state and public assets, or the distribution of public land to businessmen linked to the former regime, at the expense of the popular class and the public state.
More generally, there are three main objectives in these sectarian tensions and attacks. Firstly, instrumentalizing sectarian tensions, and the narrative of “Mazlumiya Sunniya” (Sunni victimhood) to try to build a popular consentment and unite large segments of the Arab Sunni community around them, despite many political and social differences within this community.
Sectarianism is fundamentally a tool for consolidating power and dividing society. It serves to distract the popular classes from socio-economic and political issues by scapegoating a particular group — defined by sect or ethnicity — as the root of the country’s problems and a security threat, thereby justifying repressive and discriminatory policies against it. Moreover, sectarianism acts as a powerful mechanism of social control, shaping the course of class struggle by fostering dependence between the popular classes and their elite leadership. As a result, the popular classes are stripped of independent political agency and instead come to be defined—and engage politically—through their sectarian identity. Also in this regard, the new ruling authority is following in the footsteps of the former Assad regime, continuing to use sectarian policies and practices as a means of governance, control and social division.
Secondly, these sectarian attacks and tensions seek to break democratic space or dynamics from below. Following the March 2025 massacres, people have become scared to organize. For instance, protests in different governorates in January and February 2025 by laid-off public employees have been organized, as were attempts to organize alternative trade unions, or at least coordination structures. However, the sectarian massacres in the coastal areas significantly reduced the potency of the protest movement, because of fear that armed groups close or from the new ruling authorities might react with violence. The massacres in Suwayda only reinforced this dynamic. New protests occurred in coastal areas at the end of the year 2025, which were also met with violence.
Thirdly, these sectarian attacks allowed the new ruling authorities in Damascus to reassess their domination in some territories (coastal areas) and try to do so in the areas with significant Druze populations, although unachieved particularly in the province of Suwayda, frustrating the central authorities. The objectives of the ruling authorities in these events were therefore part of a broader strategy to centralise power and consolidate their domination in areas outside of their total control.
Democracy is a Daily Struggle to be Won
While any post-Assad government would have inherited a daunting set of political and economic problems, the current ruling authorities led by HTS bring their own set of challenges. Their political and economic orientation makes it even harder to establish the foundations for a viable and inclusive democratic reconstruction process. Moreover, its policies are resulting in increasing loss of the country’s sovereignty to foreign actors. At the same time, HTS has sought to consolidate its own power in the state's institutions, army and society.
This is why the policies of the new ruling authorities dominated by HTS should not be viewed as separate files: they are connected. Indeed, rooting the new Syria in a total alliance with the Western-led axis and its regional allies, and seeking forms of normalization with Israel, help consolidate the external legitimacy of the new ruling elite and attract foreign investments, including through privatisation of state assets and liberalization of the economy. The implementation of such policies - normalization with Israel and neoliberal dynamics impoverishing further society and deepening socio-economic inequalities - could create instability in the country, including through protests movements and rising opposition.
Here, sectarianism is a useful tool to try to build a so-called homogeneous Sunni bloc, in trying to ignore and hide socio-economic and regional differences, in order to neutralise dissent in the country or mobilise sections of the population against particular groups to divert them from class dynamics and divide the population.
We must be clear: the ruling authorities will not change its policies and behavior, or even make real concessions in favor of the political and socio-economic interests of the Syrian popular classes, without a change in the balance of forces and moreover the construction and development of a counter power within the society, which gathers democratic and progressive networks and actors. Democracy is a daily struggle: it has to be won and is not given.